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Transitional Perspective:
The Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology & Policy (ISCIP) has entered its own 
transitional phase as has our founding director, University Professor Uri Ra’anan, on his 
way to retirement.   We are honored, therefore, to present in this issue of Perspective, 
an agenda-setting article by Professor Ra’anan that cuts through ideological debates 
over the nature of regimes across the former Soviet Union to identify a critical, common 
struggle for each state to attain and maintain legitimacy. 
The quest for state legitimacy may be the foundational struggle of all transitional 
regimes, but as careful examination reveals, the states of the former Soviet Union have 
encountered a series of uniquely accumulated elements in the detritus of the Soviet 
empire that binds them together in their efforts to obtain this elusive legitimacy.
Susan J. Cavan
Editor
~~~
Elusive Legitimacy: State and Regime in the 
Post-Soviet Arena
By Uri Ra’anan
The new “Popular Fronts” that colored the expiring USSR during its terminal stage 
comprised two denominations: national and proto-democratic, sometimes both, more 
often the first precluded the other. National aspirations, inevitably in recent history, had 
to be attained in territorial form – statehood and independence. Ay, there’s the rub….
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A) STATE 
The Tsarist Empire had been a multinational state ruled by Great Russians, but they 
constituted merely a plurality, well short of a majority of the population.  (1)  Lenin’s state 
started with the pretense of self-government for most nationalities – formally a 
federation of supposedly autonomous republics. In reality, Lenin’s state, like Stalin’s, 
was stifled by ultra-centralism, so that these republics were still-born, created by the 
Red Army’s bayonets.
The history of these republics, however, reemphasizes the warning that tyrannies 
should beware of creating seemingly lifeless – and therefore supposedly innocuous – 
entities, in a pretense that political life has not been extinguished (yet another example 
of hypocrisy as the deference that vice pays to virtue). Thus, Mussolini, it may be 
recalled, purely for show, created the Fascist Grand Council, a body of politically 
impotent puppets. Yet one night in 1943, with Italy succumbing to forces Mussolini had 
provoked into war, the Grand Council convened and, in a single flicker of political life, 
ended Mussolini’s regime. The USSR’s fifteen “Union Republics,” similarly lifeless for 
decades, toward the end of Gorbachev’s rule suddenly provided the ingots into which 
the streams of red-hot molten national fervor could be poured.
These Union Republics, however, were largely artificial entities, meant to simulate, 
rather than to nurture and protect, the nationality whose respective name each bore. 
Population statistics demonstrate this aspect. Just before the Soviet Union imploded, 
71,300,000 persons (25% of the USSR’s population) lived outside a Union Republic 
named after their nationality, while 27,850,000 did not even have such a Republic of 
“their own.”  A particularly glaring instance concerned the Tatars, once masters of an 
empire that included most of Russia. 6,646,000 Tatars (not including 269,000 Crimean 
Tatars) outnumbered no less than nine of the fifteen titular nationalities of the Union 
Republics (some with less than a third of the Tatar population). The formal excuse for 
excluding the Tatars was that, since Union Republics had the (purely hypothetical) right 
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to secede, they had to be located in the USSR’s outer periphery, whereas Tatars live 
around the Upper Volga. (More on this topic later.)
Moreover, in one of the Union Republics, the titular nationality constituted a minority. 
Kazakhs in 1989 were only 39.7% of Kazakhstan’s population (although this has 
changed since that republic gained independence). In the case of the Russian Republic, 
no less than 27,194,000 inhabitants, almost 19%, were non-Russians, many 
concentrated along the frontiers with other Republics (several million in the North 
Caucasus where Great Russians constitute a small minority). (2) This indicates that 
delimitation of Russia’s frontiers along genuinely national lines could have diminished 
considerably the size of the minority subjected to Russian rule. Chechnya, surely, 
provides a dramatic example of this category. Moreover, 25,264,000 Great Russians, 
17.4% of the total, found themselves in other Republics (eastern and southern Ukraine, 
northern and eastern Kazakhstan, the Baltic Republics, etc.). (3)  This Russian diaspora 
ensured that the majority of the titular nationality in some Republics (Latvia, Estonia, 
Ukraine) would shrink considerably, with the Great Russian presence constituting a 
disruptive element, reverberating internationally, as demonstrated in the Baltic 
Republics.
The dissonance between the boundaries of various Republics and of their respective 
titular nationalities was no accident. The Soviet regime had not intended to create 
conditions that could constitute ethnically homogeneous, potentially independent, 
countries. (4)  Yet it was inevitable that the new national Popular Fronts of the late 
1980s would attempt to seize territorial power, each in the Republic bearing the name of 
its nationality – irrespective of the ethnic coherence of that Republic’s population or the 
delimitation of its frontiers.
This dissonance facilitated the attempts of voracious neighbors to encroach upon newly 
independent Republics and to question their legitimacy and territorial integrity, as 
demonstrated by Russia’s de facto seizure of Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
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and by Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov’s constant reiteration of the demand to incorporate 
Ukraine’s Crimea in Russia.
Now it might be objected that, irrespective of the Soviet antecedents of the fifteen post-
Soviet Republics or the ethnic incoherence of their territories or their frontiers, they are 
now full members of the international community, as demonstrated by their admission to 
the United Nations. One wishes it were so. The UN, in its various capacities, and the 
“International Community” have followed lamely in Russia’s path, particularly since Putin 
ascended to power, treating most of the fourteen non-Russian post-Soviet Republics, 
with respect to their territorial integrity, as less than sovereign. The disappearance of 
(even a pathetic) international presence from Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
after Russia’s August 2008 incursion speaks for itself. Nor has anyone been willing to 
speak out about the Russian military role in keeping Moldova bisected.
What hopes one had for the legitimacy of the post-Soviet republics depended not least 
upon their mutual recognition and continued behavior congruent with that recognition. 
The legitimacy of the new Russian Republic itself (as a state that had seceded from the 
USSR) and its frontiers depended surely upon Russia’s recognition of the independence 
and territorial integrity of its equally new ex-Soviet neighbors. That was duly extended in 
the hours after the implosion of the USSR. However, even then, in the first few days of 
Russia’s new identity, President Boris Yel’tsin qualified this recognition by referring 
vaguely to the need for changing Russian borders with Ukraine and Kazakhstan. He 
dropped this claim subsequently, realizing perhaps that such demands did not enhance 
Russia’s own status.
However, his foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, probably the least irredentist of Russian 
post-1989 spokesmen, soon stated that it would be unacceptable “to pull out completely  
from the zones of traditional influence, which…were won over the centuries” and that 
“we should not leave regions that for centuries have been spheres of Russian interests.” 
He added a new concept to international norms of citizenship, saying, “If a Russian, an 
ethnic Russian, or a Russian-speaker, someone who feels close to Russia – there are 
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Uzbeks and Kazakhs and Kyrgyz who consider themselves in essence Russian-
speakers…if all of these people, or some of them, wish to have Russian citizenship as 
well as Kyrgyz, Kazakh, or Uzbek citizenship, of course they will be under the protection 
of the Russian state….” This approach was realized in action by his far less liberal and 
democratic successors; they proceeded to extend Russian citizenship unilaterally to 
persons who, at least nominally, were the citizens of other republics and to claim that 
the areas in question consequently were under Russian “protection.” (5)
Of course, Kozyrev and Yel’tsin, even if not entirely resistant to the imperial bug, do not 
compare to Vladimir Putin and the various other persons who have stoked Russia’s 
increasingly expansionistic policy toward the other post-Soviet states – to mention only 
Yevgeni Primakov. Needless to say, the victims should not be blamed for the sins of the 
perpetrators. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of a state cannot rest entirely on formalities: if 
it is unable to preserve its territorial integrity and its freedom to make political decisions, 
inevitably one begins to question whether it continues to be a genuinely independent 
entity. Hosting the Embassies of other countries and participating in the UN General 
Assembly may not suffice.
That may not seem entirely fair, but it is a fact. Russia’s neighbors have confronted an 
unenviable choice: to resist and then probably to be occupied (since no major 
international actors appear prepared to assist victims of aggression) while never 
ceasing to struggle or to yield slowly but constantly to incursions upon their 
independence. The former alternative, while perhaps leading at least to temporary 
obliteration as an international entity, paradoxically may cause less harm to the 
legitimacy of the victim than its collaboration with those who undermine its integrity step 
by step. The history of Poland, 1772-1919, is a case in point. The state disappeared 
from the map of Europe for a century and a half, but the cause of an independent 
Poland haunted the scene for the whole period, because Poles participated in one 
uprising after another. Poland’s partition never attained full legitimacy.
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Actually, resistance does not have to take the form of armed force. The victorious 
Germans annexed Alsace-Lorraine from France in 1871. The population, although 
largely German-speaking, never accepted the new status of the region and refused to 
participate in elections to the Reichstag, Germany’s parliament. Even toward the end of 
the German occupation, nine of Alsace-Lorraine’s fifteen electoral districts still continued 
the boycott. The result was that the issue of Alsace-Lorraine was perpetuated on the 
diplomatic landscape. The fact that defeated France in 1871 signed a document ceding 
Alsace-Lorraine failed somehow to give its annexation by Germany full legitimacy.
So much for behavior that obstructs conquest from conferring legitimacy upon the victor. 
However, the vanquished also have to demonstrate by their actions that they continue 
to contend for legitimacy. Earlier, this paper referred to the Tatars who, once masters 
over most of Russia, had been subjugated by Moscow, their own former satrapy. Since 
that event, in the 16th century, only their lesser cousins, the Crimean Tatars, aided by 
the Ottoman Turks, had seriously troubled Russia from time to time. The elite of the 
Volga Tatars, on the other hand, had tried to assimilate by intermarriage, some 
converting to Orthodox Christianity.
Considering that their geopolitical center of gravity was not that far east of Moscow, 
Russian rulers were not given undue cause for concern, despite occasional Tatar 
unrest.  With Russia’s apparent disintegration, however, early in 1918, a nationalist 
Tatar revolt was suppressed by a young Bolshevik, himself a Tatar, Mirza Sultan-Galiev 
(Stalin’s subordinate in the Commissariat of Nationalities). While calling for the 
supremacy of eastern nationalities over Europeans, Sultan-Galiev did not emphasize 
special Tatar concerns. The 1918 affair remained essentially an isolated event, although 
in 1936, the 1950s, and 1977, Tatar spokesmen called for Tatarstan to be promoted to 
Union Republic status. Subsequently, the USSR’s implosion apparently did not trigger 
serious Tatar aspirations for independence. (Admittedly, the Tatar population resembles 
an island in a Russian sea and constitutes only 53.3% of Tatarstan’s inhabitants.) 
However, situated over considerable natural resources, the current autonomous Tatar 
Republic, an entity within the Russian Federation, enjoys a reasonable amount of self-
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management as a result of a power-sharing “Treaty” with Moscow. Its President, 
Mintimer Shaimiev, appears content with economic gain and has shown little urge for 
more than that, perhaps because only 36.3% of Russia’s Tatars live in Tatarstan. In the 
light of this history, it is understandable that Tatars are not viewed currently as 
contenders for independence and for the accompanying international legitimation. Of 
course, by their actions, they themselves could change that status at any time.
Delegitimation, in any case, serves as a formidable weapon of intimidation. Even before 
the formal dissolution of the USSR, the KGB had threatened the aspirants for the 
independence of non-Russian Union Republics like Georgia that, if they persisted in 
efforts to secede, they would be confronted by forces that would “raise the question of 
the borders of the Republic and the legitimacy of the organ of power elected there.” (6)  
When Georgia broke away, this threat was implemented by means of Russian military 
and political support for Abkhaz and South Ossetian secessionists from Georgia (7) 
and, eventually, by attempts to delegitimize Georgia’s President. However, those that 
resort to such means of coercion ought to beware. One of the organizers and military 
supporters of Abkhaz secession from Georgia was an officer with close links to Russian 
Military Intelligence (GRU). The same person, Shamil Basayev, then showed his 
ideological consistency by organizing and leading another secessionist movement, by 
Chechnya against Russia – a bloody struggle the last word of which may not have been 
spoken yet.
B) REGIME 
So much for the issue of territorial legitimacy. (8) The question of a regime’s legitimacy, 
of course, has been the subject of a major category of literature, and the issue 
continues to beset most post-Soviet republics. It may be viewed as solved only in the 
case of the Baltic States and, to a lesser extent, Georgia after the Rose Revolution. 
Ukraine, since the Orange Revolution, appeared for a time to belong to the same 
category, but recent developments have raised serious questions.
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In countries that constitute the debris of empire, such as most post-Soviet republics, 
political discontinuity is a given, and by definition, one cannot create time-hallowed 
institutions. In their absence, political power is bound to lack the most important 
ingredient, legitimacy.
Legitimation of power requires a transparent, consistently implemented, non-arbitrary 
transfer of power mechanism. It can develop only – at a minimum – upon the foundation 
of a Rechtsstaat, a state that (perhaps even with some authoritarian features) obeys its 
own laws, whether “good” or “bad.” It requires the presence of a civil society, i.e. a 
sizable segment of the population that, through its spontaneous social, economic, and 
political interactions and organization, can participate in the life and governance of the 
state. It rests upon toleration of and respect for pluralism and the institutionalization of 
group rights. (9)
Paradoxically, Russia itself perhaps came closest to having a truly legitimate regime 
while the USSR still existed, at least on paper. On June 12, 1991, Russia held the first 
and, by general assent, perhaps the cleanest of popular elections for the presidency. 
With the participation of 74.7% of the electorate, Boris Yel’tsin won 57.3% against the 
serious competition of noteworthy contenders, like the reputable former Soviet Prime 
Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, the ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky (enjoying the not-so-
secret support of the departing regime’s security forces), and the former Soviet Interior 
Minister, Vadim Bakatin. By contrast, the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, was not 
prepared to submit his candidature for Soviet President to a popular vote.
The undeniable legitimacy of the June 1991 election carried Yel’tsin and his new state – 
the Russian Federation (RF) – over such minefields as the attempted August 1991 
coup, the December 1991 implosion of the USSR, and the serious political-economic 
crises of the fledgling RF.  Sixteen months later, in the April 25, 1993 referendum, it still 
gave Yel’tsin a creditable 58.8% of the reasonably clean vote of personal confidence. 
However, this degree of support drained as Yel’tsin demonstrated both increasing 
incompetence and failure to remain in touch with his base. In September 1993, the 
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president’s aura was clouded by the armed clash with Duma insurgents. The resulting 
bullet holes on the Duma building perhaps injured Yel’tsin’s legitimacy less than his 
actions, a few weeks later.
In order to recoup the prestige of the Presidency, in December 1993, with an additional 
referendum, Yel’tsin undermined his own legitimacy by suddenly changing the 
established criteria: to pass, the referendum was supposed to be supported by a 
majority of the electorate. Yel’tsin changed this requirement unilaterally to ask merely for 
a majority of those actually voting (as long as a majority of the electorate participated in 
the vote). This clearly lower barrier was all that Yel’tsin was able to pass. (10)  Even so, 
compared with the increasingly authoritarian character of the Putin (charitably Putin-
Medvedev) regime, close now to being a single-party state (with the Communist Party a 
cardboard opposition), Yel’tsin’s 1993 Russian Federation had some positive features. 
Yel’tsin had to pretend, Putin doesn’t bother. The fact that there is no serious opposition 
now doesn’t exactly constitute legitimation.
Belarus, of course, never really embarked upon an attempt to overcome the Soviet 
legacy and remains part of an unfortunate list that includes at least four of the five 
Central Asian republics.
Islom Karimov, First Secretary of the Uzbek SSR’s Communist Party, proceeded 
smoothly to become independent Uzbekistan’s first president – now serving his third 
consecutive term despite the two-term limitation of the Uzbek constitution.
Similarly Nursultan Nazarbayev, First Secretary of the Kazakh SSR’s Communist Party 
and then that SSR’s President, with an interval of merely two months became newly 
independent Kazakhstan’s President in an uncontested election, was reelected in 
another uncontested election (his main opponent being barred from running), was 
reelected once more and then had the constitution amended so that he could remain 
President for life.
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Again, Saparmurat Niyazov was First Secretary of the Turkmen SSR’s Communist Party 
and then that SSR’s president, was appointed to the Presidency of newly independent 
Turkmenistan, and then elected to that post in an uncontested vote. The Turkmen 
parliament then appointed him President for life, “Turkmenbashi.” After his death in 
2006, the constitutional Acting President was removed and Gurbanguly 
Berdimuhammedov was elected President, with the other candidates publicly endorsing 
him.
Tajikistan’s role in this Central Asian picture differed only in as far as it was more violent. 
Rahmon Nabiev, the first President, leader of a hard-line faction of the Communist 
Party, fell after a year marked by civil war. He was succeeded eventually by Emomali 
Rahmon (supported by the governments of the Russian Federation and of neighboring 
Uzbekistan), in a heavily disputed election following the outlawing of four opposition 
parties. He was reelected, after his term had been extended to seven years, and then 
again (in an election boycotted by the opposition parties).
Similarly, in Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akayev, a member of the CPSU Central Committee, 
became President of the Kyrgyz SSR, was elected President of independent 
Kyrgyzstan, reelected twice and his term extended. However, then the Central Asian 
picture changed. In 2005, after a widely disputed parliamentary election, Akayev was 
forced from power by nation-wide demonstrations in what has become known as the 
“Tulip Revolution” (in imitation of Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution” and Georgia’s “Rose 
Revolution”). Opposition leader Kurmanbek Bakiyev won popular election and became 
President in an uneasy tandem with another opposition figure. This arrangement broke 
down, and Bakiyev held an election in which he scored a very questionable 76.4%.
The picture that emerges is not very pretty, but it is clear, with the possible exception of 
the Kyrgyz leadership, legitimacy seems fated to remain an outlandish term (for that 
matter, the Central Asian republics, as such, have questionable identities with artificial 
boundaries – as can be seen when viewing the interwoven tentacles of Uzbek and Tajik 
territories).
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Separated by the Caspian from its Central Asian kin, the Azerbaijan SSR’s Communist 
Party First Secretary, Avaz Mutalibov, became the newly independent country’s first 
President. However, unlike the Central Asians, he encountered a serious war with 
neighboring Armenia in which Azerbaijan lost a sizable portion of its territory. 
Consequently, Mutalibov was overthrown in a coup the winner of which himself was 
replaced within a year, following a further coup. The final victor was another former 
Azerbaijan CP First Secretary Gaidar Aliyev, who proceeded to win two terms as the 
country’s President, to be succeeded in the post by his son, Ilham Aliyev, who also 
secured two terms. Just like his counterparts across the Caspian, Ilham Aliyev then 
attained a prospective lifetime position by having presidential term limits removed. 
The Armenian victors in that war (assisted by Russia), did not enjoy much tranquility 
either. Their first president, Levon Ter-Petrosian, won a questionable election for a 
second term and was ousted because of an alleged secret deal with Azerbaijan. His 
successor, Robert Kocharian, won two terms and was followed by his hand-picked heir, 
Serzh Sarkisian, who then won a highly questionable election that precipitated domestic 
confrontations, leading to casualties. The opposition was led by…Ter-Petrosian.
These mirror images of successive Central Asian and Transcaucasian regimes 
demonstrate why the application of the term “legitimacy” is laughable. However, that 
brings us to two cases that, we all had hoped, would prove to be durable exceptions to 
this sad litany: the reference, of course, is to the “Orange” and “Rose” revolutions. The 
spirit was there, but even in the case of Ukraine and Georgia, the flesh seems to have 
been less than willing. Both countries witnessed a major regime change that was 
carried out with laudable absence of violence. And, for a while, there was a remarkably 
un-post-Soviet atmosphere. Alas, it was not to last. The leaders of Ukraine’s “Orange 
Revolution,” unable or unwilling to continue cooperating, fell out, bringing disrepute to 
the legacy of that Revolution. In Georgia’s case, personal rivalries soon disrupted the 
brief coalition that had created the “Rose Revolution.” This was exacerbated by 
Georgia’s disorganized military resistance to the Russian invasion.
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However, even had there been a happier outcome in both countries, the very term 
“Revolution” surely indicates the absence of the basic requirement for legitimation of 
power: “a transparent, consistently implemented, non-arbitrary transfer of power 
mechanism.” (11)  Had that condition applied, no “Revolution” would have been needed. 
However, at a minimum, one might have settled at least for consistent post-
revolutionary systems of governance. It was not to be: Witness the efforts of Ukraine’s 
revolutionary contenders not only to seek the embrace of elements of the pre-revolution 
regime, but also to change the very features of the country’s constitution that could 
sustain the new order. (12)
Unfortunately, therefore, neither the post-Soviet states, nor their regimes, may be 
viewed as fully “legitimate,” by any of the definitions that have been presented in this 
article. The story of the three Baltic republics seems to indicate that truly legitimate new 
states and regimes can develop and function consistently only when they flourish in a 
secure environment with like-minded countries. Being enveloped by the protective 
mantle of NATO, the Baltic states have been able to attain this goal. However, another 
factor played a major role: unlike other post-Soviet republics, the Baltic states had a 
pre-Soviet history of two decades of independence, during at least part of which they 
enjoyed a reasonably democratic system.
Pre-Soviet Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia underwent such experience for only 
months, or at most a couple of years, at the end of World War I. Thus, the necessary 
precedent of genuine independence and a reasonably representative form of 
government was lacking even in these countries, not to speak of Central Asia.
Source Notes: 
1) Once Lenin’s state was shorn of the Tsarist Empire’s Polish and Finnish territories, 
with some 17 million inhabitants, the proportion of Great Russians rose to slightly over 
one-half of the population and stayed around 50% even after the USSR’s territorial 
expansion, 1939-1945. (That proportion may have reflected statistical inflation since, by 
attempting to “pass” as Great Russians, the children of ethnically mixed marriages may 
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have hoped to improve their chances of obtaining desirable positions and higher 
education. In both categories, Great Russians benefited notoriously from a 
disproportionately high “quota.”)
2) In 1989, indigenous North Caucasian peoples outnumbered Great Russians 2.7 to 1 
(3.5 million to 1.3 million). By 2002, they outnumbered Great Russians 5.9 to 1 (5.3 
million to 0.9 million). 
3) The statistics cited are based on the last Soviet census, 1989, for the simple reason 
that all subsequent numbers emanated from separate censuses held by post-Soviet 
republics at different times, using different criteria, not to mention that some were less 
than reliable. The 1989 census, by Soviet standards, resulted in fairly creditable 
statistics.  The numbers concerning Tatrstan, however, are derived from Russia’s 2003 
census.
4) In fairness, not all of the failure to achieve contiguity between ethnic and Republican 
frontiers was due to deliberate gerrymandering. The gigantic economic upheavals of the 
1920s and 1930s provided major dislocation of population and the shocks of the 1941 
German invasion added to this factor. However, to take the example of the Northern 
Caucasus, the inclusion of more than 5,000,000 non-Great Russians in the Russian 
Republic was a deliberate political act. Moreover, in the case of Latvia and Estonia, at 
least, it is clear that the huge increase of the East Slav population was due, in part, to a 
political decision. These two Republics, while still independent states until 1939/1940, 
had relatively insignificant Russian populations. (In 1930, only 12% of Latvia’s and 8% 
of Estonia’s inhabitants were Great Russians.) As a result of massive settlement, 
particularly of military and military retiree families, the size of the Great Russian, 
Ukrainian, and Belarusian “minority” tripled to constitute 39.4% of the two Republic’s 
total population (according to the 1989 census). Whole areas, like the Latvian capital of 
Riga and the Estonian northeastern quadrant of Narva, became predominantly Russian.
5) The author’s chapter 2, pp. 22-24, in Russia: A Return to Imperialism?, U. Ra’anan 
and K. Martin, Eds., New York, 1996: St. Martin’s Press.
6) Ibid.
7) The Abkhaz and South Ossetian minorities constituted only 1.7% and 3.0% 
respectively of Georgia’s population. In Abkhazia itself, ethnic Georgians constituted 
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46.2% of the population, while ethnic Abkhaz were only 17.3%. This was changed when 
the Abkhaz, aided by Russian military personnel, expelled most ethnic Georgians, 
numbering more than 242,000 persons.  
8) Formal legitimacy might have required conformity with the April 1990 Soviet law on 
secession, which contained stipulations that were not met during subsequent 
secessions.
9) The author’s Preface, pp. xv-xvi, in Flawed Succession, Uri Ra’anan, Ed., Lexington 
Books, 2006.
10) To illustrate this change with an hypothetical example: the original requirement 
meant that, for a referendum to pass, more than 6 million voters, in an electorate of 12 
million, would have to approve it. Yel’tsin’s change halved this requirement. Now, one 
half of one half of the electorate was needed, i.e. only some 3 million out of 6 million 
votes cast.
11) Flawed Succession, p. 14. 
12) This section of the paper does not include the Baltic States or Moldova. The former 
are now sheltered by NATO membership and enjoy reasonably sustained legitimate 
government (the physical opposition of the East Slav minority becoming ineffectual). On 
the other hand, Moldova’s very existence is questionable, the Russian Fourth Army 
bisecting the country along the Dnestr, allowing the left bank de facto to secede. 
Departing President Vladimir Voronin,  based on the (nominally) Communist Party, had 
faced the growing movement for reunion with Romania. This prospect had been held 
back by the unappetizing post-Ceausescu regime in Bucharest. That situation, however, 
is changing.
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